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ABSTRACT 
 
Availability of Family-Friendly Work Practices and Implicit 
Wage Costs: New Evidence from Canada 
 
Using Canadian linked employer-employee data covering the period 1999-2005, I examine 
the determinants of the availability of family-friendly “care” practices and the impact of such 
practices on wages. The results show that the provision of family-friendly practices is not 
mainly derived from socio-demographic characteristics of workers but rather from job- and 
firm-related factors. The findings also reveal that there is a trade-off between the provision of 
family-friendly practices and earnings indicating the existence of an implicit market in which 
workers face reductions in their wages. This result supports the hypothesis that family-
friendly benefits are to some extent conceived as a gift or a signal that employers care about 
employees’ family responsibilities and, in return, employees are willing to “buy” these 
practices and thus accept a wage offset. 
 
 
JEL Classification: J13, J32, J70 
 
Keywords: family-friendly “care” practices, linked employer-employee data, 
simultaneous probit model, wage equation 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
 
Ali Fakih 
Department of Economics 
Lebanese American University 
P.O. Box: 13-5053 Chouran 
Beirut 1102 2801 
Lebanon 
E-mail: afakih@lau.edu.lb 
 
 
 2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Firms as well as governments invest considerable resources in family-friendly work practices 
that attempt to reduce the negative consequences generated by the work-family conflict.
1
 It is 
surprising, therefore, that the availability of such practices is quite modest in most firms (Bloom 
et al., 2011; Evans, 2001). For example, childcare services are available in 5.3% of firms in 
Germany, 3.6% of firms in Great Britain and 7.6% of firms in the U.S. (see Bloom et al., 2011: 
table 1b). Moreover, there is no agreement among scholars as to whether, and to what extent, the 
availability of family-friendly practices has a bearing on employees’ wages. For instance, 
Heywood et al. (2007) find that some family-friendly practices are associated with an implicit 
reduction in wages. The objective of this paper is twofold. I first examine the determinants of the 
availability of three family-friendly “care” practices: assistance for childcare, assistance for elder 
care and extended health care.
2
 Second, I investigate the relationship between such practices and 
wages. These family-friendly care programs are a possible way to promote workers’ health and 
provide practical assistance for these workers who have to care for elderly and dependent 
individuals (Osterman, 1995: 682). 
Despite the importance of family-friendly practices in reducing the negative 
consequences generated by the work-family conflict, there is relatively little empirical evidence 
on the determinants of the availability of such practices. The common argument in the literature 
is that working for a firm providing such benefits does not guarantee that family-friendly 
practices will be available for all employees in that firm (e.g., Gray and Tudball, 2003: 270; 
Whitehouse and Zetlin, 1999: 230). Budd and Brey (2003: 87) argue that employees are not 
equally aware of the availability of family-friendly work practices. Gray and Tudball (2003) find 
that family-friendly practices are more available to managers, professionals and administrators. 
                                                     
1
 Work-family conflict is an important issue for firms because of the cost related to the dissatisfaction at work 
(Duxbury and Higgins, 2003) and the increase in the absenteeism rate (Vistnes, 1997). Moreover, work-family 
conflict has negative consequences on the physical and mental health of employees, which may lead to an increase 
in health care spending (Duxbury et al., 1999). 
2
 Extended health care is a part of fringe benefits and complements the coverage offered by provincial health 
insurance plans. Extended health care contributes to the objective of ensuring a better reconciliation of work and 
family life because it can affect all employee family members. It contributes to improving the physical and mental 
health of employees and their dependents (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC), 2000). 
O’Brien (2003: 14) argues that firms provide extended health care to improve workers’ health, which may increase 
productivity and organizational performance and reduce absenteeism and turnover at work. Additionally, firms 
might benefit from providing such health insurance by recruiting and retaining high-quality workers. Empirical 
studies also show that the availability of health benefits reduces job mobility (Anderson, 1997).  
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They note that governments must consider policies that favor a better availability of 
family-friendly practices for all employees, regardless of their occupation, work status and level 
of education. Budd and Mumford (2006) conclude that the effect of the independent variables on 
the availability of family-friendly practices is not similar across all measures of these practices. 
They show, however, that variables with the greatest impact on the availability of family-friendly 
practices are average current job tenure of the workforce; proportion of the part-time workforce; 
proportion of the workforce educated past secondary school; proportion of the female workforce; 
proportion of the workforce with children; and workplaces with at least 500 employees. More 
recently, Bloom et al. (2011) show that firms with a higher proportion of qualified workers and 
women managers offer more family-friendly practices. 
There are many reasons to doubt that workers provided with family-friendly practices 
face an implicit reduction in their wages. That is, there may exist a significant wage premium 
associated with the availability of such practices. According to the economic theory, in a 
competitive labour market, wages are usually higher in jobs with less desirable characteristics 
and more risks (Rosen, 1974). This author justifies such a phenomenon through the existence of 
an implicit market that allocates job attributes valued by workers but that are costly for firms. 
Equivalently, family-friendly practices could be considered benefits for workers and costs for 
firms. I postulate that wages are lower when firms provide such family-friendly practices. A 
number of empirical studies corroborate this hypothesis. Heywood et al. (2007: 296) argue that 
firms attract employees who implicitly accept a salary reduction to offset the cost of providing 
family-friendly practices. They note that the implicit costs in employee salaries induce the 
government to intervene in the market of family-friendly practices. By the same token, 
Baughman et al. (2003) find that flextime and assistance for childcare are associated with salary 
reduction. In contrast, Gariety and Shaffer (2001) find that the availability of family-friendly 
practices is positively correlated with earnings. They argue that firms reward their most 
productive employees with such practices. Johnson and Provan (1995) find a positive impact of 
employer-sponsored childcare on earnings. However, they find that flextime is not significantly 
associated with wages for men. Thus, the net influence of family-friendly practices on wages 
remains an empirical issue, and further investigation may be warranted. 
In this paper, I provide additional evidence on the availability of family-friendly practices 
by tackling the case of Canada. Specifically, I examine two questions. First, what are the worker 
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and firm characteristics that affect the provision of family-friendly practices? Second, is there a 
trade-off between wages and the provision of family-friendly practices? My paper is 
conceptually similar to Budd and Mumford (2006) and Heywood et al. (2007), however, it 
improves on the previous works in two ways. I first estimate a simultaneous probit model while 
allowing unobserved worker and firm effects to be correlated across different models. This 
model allows us to determine whether family-friendly practices are available simultaneously in 
the same workplace. Second, I take into account unobserved effects in the wage equation. I resort 
to instrumental variables to control for the potential endogeneity of the firm’s decision: it is 
plausible that firms with the most family-friendly practices are also those that may have 
considerable impact on wages. I use the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) 1999-2005 
dataset provided by Statistics Canada. The use of the Canadian WES data is relevant because (1) 
the survey provides information on a representative sample of Canadian establishments with 
information on their employees at different points in time; (2) the survey includes detailed 
demographic, job and firm characteristics; (3) the linked nature of the survey enables controlling 
for unobserved firm heterogeneity; and lastly, (4) the longitudinal character of the survey allows 
us to take into account unobserved worker heterogeneity. The paper first provides a brief 
summary of the conceptual framework, and then presents the data along with the descriptive 
statistics of variables used in the analysis. Next, the econometric specification is discussed 
followed by the empirical results. The final section provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Conceptual framework 
 
2.1 Availability of family-friendly practices 
 
Family-friendly practices can be represented on three levels (see Figure 1 below). First, a firm 
may or may not offer family-friendly practices. For example, firms may offer such practices as a 
means to attract certain types of employees, where family-friendly practices could be considered 
a component of fringe benefits packages and are normally specified in the employment contract. 
Firms may also offer family-friendly practices as a human resource practice geared towards 
performance improvement (Bloom et al., 2011: 343). Second, if firms offer family-friendly 
practices, employees may or may not have access to these practices. Lastly, if employees have 
access to such practices, they may or may not decide to use them. In this paper, I focus on the 
first level. 
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 Figure 1: Relationship between availability, access and usage of family-friendly practices  
 
 
 
Analyzing the determinants of the availability of family-friendly practices (i.e., fringe 
benefits) and their relation to wages involves a firm’s decision regarding offering benefits and a 
worker’s decision whether to choose a job with a particular combination of wage and fringe 
benefits, where workers have heterogeneous preferences for family-friendly practices (Senesky, 
2005: 749; Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995). The determinants of such practices must therefore be 
addressed, taking into account both worker and firm characteristics. For example, demographic 
changes such as the higher participation rates of women in the labour market have increased the 
demand for family-friendly practices (Bardoel et al., 1999; Budd and Mumford, 2006). 
Following Bardoel et al. (1999) and Budd and Mumford (2006), I include a set of demographic 
characteristics that are likely to increase the potential demand for family-friendly practices. 
Specifically, I include variables on gender, marital status, race, age, immigrants, number of 
children, single-parent families, income and a measure of health. 
An important factor that may also influence the probability of providing family-friendly 
practices is the level of human capital accumulation, which is measured by seniority, labour 
market experience and education. Seniority represents an employee’s level of stability under his 
or her employer, and family-friendly practices, which are considered non-pecuniary benefits, are 
expected to increase with seniority. Regarding labour market experience, one can assume that 
family-friendly work obtained with an employer is not lost when workers change employers. We 
 6 
 
would expect that workers who have accumulated more years of education enjoy more 
family-friendly practices. The theory of human capital predicts that level of education is 
inversely proportional to the time allotted to household tasks (Becker, 1985). The greater the 
education gap between employees is, the more employees with higher education are expected to 
demand family-friendly benefits. 
The labour supply literature, which integrates job characteristics into the neoclassical 
labour supply model (e.g., Senesky, 2005), suggests that firms provide family-friendly practices 
if they contribute to increasing firm’s profits. In a context in which individuals choose a 
particular combination of work hours, fringe benefits and wages based on their unobservable 
preferences, job and firm characteristics are likely to play a role in the provision of 
family-friendly practices. The rich structure of the dataset allows us to include a variety of job- 
and firm-related characteristics. Following Budd and Mumford (2006), Evans (2002) and Gray 
and Tudball (2003), I include variables on work schedules, job promotion, supervisory positions, 
union status, workforce characteristics and firm size indicators. For example, some firms may 
offer family-friendly practices only to managers as additional benefits. In addition, large firms 
are likely to have more formal human resource management and policies than smaller ones. We 
therefore would expect that larger firms meet fringe benefits entitlement provisions more than 
smaller firms. 
 
2.2 Family-friendly practices and wages 
 
The literature on the link between family-friendly practices and wages is divided into two 
strands. According to the first strand, family-friendly practices are considered an important 
component of fringe benefits package and are normally specified in employment contracts. This 
state of affairs would lead to the presumption that obtaining more family-friendly practices is an 
indicator of a higher wage. The positive relationship between family-friendly practices 
(non-pecuniary job benefits) and wages is consistent with job search models (e.g., Hwang et al., 
1998; Lang and Majumdar, 2004). According to those models, firms’ heterogeneity in matching 
values implies that some firms will propose a combination of high-wage and family-friendly 
practices that best balances the firms’ and workers’ preferences (e.g., to attract and retain 
high-quality workers or to reduce turnover rate). Arthur and Cook (2004) provide a different 
explanation of the positive relationship between family-friendly practices and wages. They find 
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that work-family human resource decisions are positively and significantly correlated with firm 
profits. By the same token, Perry-Smith and Blum (2001) find that offering family-friendly 
practices enhance the performance of a firm. Bloom et al. (2011) find a positive relationship 
between family-friendly practices and firm productivity. However, this relationship disappears 
after controlling for the quality of management practices. 
The second strand of literature predicts that there is a trade-off between 
employer-provided family-friendly practices and wages. Therefore, there is a hedonic 
equilibrium in which jobs with more family-friendly practices might be associated with lower 
wages. Duncan and Stafford (1980: 355-356) argue that, because of the heterogeneity in a firm’s 
ability to bear the costs associated with offering family-friendly practices, a hedonic equilibrium 
could occur in firms offering such practices. Gruber and Krueger (1991: 113) argue that an 
important portion of the cost of providing mandated fringe benefits is shifted to employees 
through lower wages. Heywood et al. (2007: 278) note that firms try to offset these costs by 
reducing employees’ wages. This result is in line with hedonic compensation theory (Rosen, 
1974). This theory implies that two jobs that differ in terms of their non-pecuniary benefits (e.g., 
family-friendly practices) will offer different wages. For example, if two employers offer the 
same salary but the first employer offers more family-friendly practices than the second, in this 
case the first employer is more beneficial to the employee. Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) show that 
labour market equilibrium may be characterized by less than the optimal combination of working 
hours and fringe benefits because work preferences are heterogeneous and unobserved by firms. 
 
3. Data 
 
I use data from the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) conducted by Statistics Canada. 
The WES has been conducted annually since 1999 and came to an end in 2005. I use all 7 years 
of available data (1999-2005). The WES is both longitudinal and linked in that it documents the 
characteristics of workers and workplaces over time. The target population for the workplace 
component of the survey is defined as the collection of all Canadian establishments that paid 
employees in March of the year of the survey. Those establishments are followed over time with 
the periodic addition of samples of new locations to maintain a representative sample. The WES 
does not cover firms located in the Yukon, the Northwest Territories or Nunavut or the public 
administration, the livestock production industry, fisheries or hunting or trapping operations. For 
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the employee component, the target population is the collection of employees working or on paid 
leave in the workplace target population. Employees are sampled from lists provided by the 
selected workplaces. For every workplace, a maximum of 24 employees are selected, and for 
establishments with less than 4 employees, all employees are sampled. 
The WES selects new employees and workplaces in odd years. The WES is therefore 
representative of employees only for the resampling years (1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005). The 
survey consists of a follow-up of the initial sample chosen in 1999, to which Statistics Canada 
adds a sample of new firms every two years. The initial sample comprises 23,540 employees in 
1999, 20,167 (85.6%) of whom were also present in 2000. In 2001, 20,352 employees were 
resampled, and 16,813 (82.6%) of them were contacted again in 2002. In 2003, 20,834 
employees were resampled, and 16,804 (80.6%) of them were contacted again in 2004. Lastly, 
24,197 employees were resampled in the last year of the survey. The final sample comprises 
81,054 observations after eliminating observations with missing values for some covariates. 
The rich structure of this survey allows us to control for a variety of factors affecting the 
availability of family-friendly practices. I construct three dummy variables that define the 
availability of family-friendly practices in the workplace. These variables take the value one if 
the employee answers “yes” to the question regarding whether a family-friendly practice is 
available to an employee in the workplace and zero otherwise. The dummies of family-friendly 
practices used in this paper are 1) assistance for childcare, 2) assistance for elder care and 3) 
extended health care. Wage variable used in this paper is the hourly wage. 
The WES dataset contains a rich set of variables describing both worker and firm 
characteristics. From the worker questionnaire, I use detailed explanatory variables on 
demographic characteristics, human capital, and on job-related characteristics. From the 
workplace questionnaire, I use variables on workforce characteristics and firm size indicators. 
Regarding worker characteristics, the following variables are constructed as dummies: gender 
(female = 1), marital status (married = 1), if the worker is from the Black minority group with 
“White” as the reference group, age is defined in years, if the worker is immigrant (immigrant = 
1), presence of children aged 0 to 18 (yes = 1), if the family is a one-parent family (single-parent 
=1), total family income from different sources, a dummy variable if the employee does not have 
any limitation in work due to health issue. Seniority (length of a worker’s employment within a 
firm) is measured in years. Experience (number of years of full time work) is also measured in 
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years. The WES only lists degrees held by each worker. Accordingly, we use this information to 
assess the role of education. We construct four dummies for education each coded as yes = 1. We 
include the following dummies: vocational diploma or some college, completed college or some 
university, bachelor or higher education completed, and industrial training or other. Working less 
than 30 hours per week is considered part-time work. Work arrangements dummies are defined 
as follows: reduced work week (following a special agreement with the employer) and 
compressed week (working more hours in a day to reduce the number of working days per 
week). Job promotion is a dummy variable equal to one if the worker obtained a promotion since 
he/she started working for this employer. Supervisor is also a dummy variable equal to one if the 
worker supervises the work of other workers. Unionization is equal to one if the worker is a 
member of a union or covered by a collective bargaining agreement. A dummy variable equals to 
one if the employer offers job training. Facing problems in filling vacant positions (dummy = 1). 
Firm size is constructed from four dummies: small (less than 20 employees); medium (20 to 99); 
large (100 to 499); and very large (500 employees or more). 
 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 presents an analysis of the variances of the availability to each of the family-friendly 
practices broken down into the overall, between-firm and within-firm components for the whole 
sample, i.e., 1999-2005. Differences in the availability of family-friendly practices between 
employees can be separated into a component due to the variation between firms (between-firm 
variation) and into a component due to differences between employees who work in the same 
firm (within-firm variation). If all of the employees in the same firms have the same availability 
of family-friendly practices, the within-firm variation will be zero and all differences between 
employees will be due to differences between firms. In contrast, if there is no correlation 
between employees working in the same firm, the level of variation in the within-firm and 
between-firm components will be the same (Gray and Tudball 2003). I find that the proportion of 
employees who report having assistance for childcare is 4.4%. I also find that the overall 
standard deviation is 0.205 for assistance for childcare. The between- and within-firm 
components indicate that the standard deviation of the variation between-firms is 0.058, 
compared to 0.204 for that of the variation within-firms. This discrepancy indicates that the 
variation between workers granted childcare is greater within firms than between firms. That is, 
 10 
 
two employees from different firms are more likely to report having assistance for childcare than 
two other employees working in the same firm. As in the case of assistance for childcare, I find 
that the between-firm variation is less than the within-firm variation for assistance for elder care 
and extended health care. 
Tables 2 and 3 present the summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis for 
employees and employers, respectively. In Table 2, the sample shows that 52.1% of employees 
are females and that 56.6% are married. I control for employee race with the variable black, who 
represent 1.1% of the sample. The average seniority is approximately 8 years, and the average 
work experience is close to 16 years. The average age of employees in the sample is 40 years. 
Immigrants represent 17.5% of the sample. Regarding education, I find that approximately 33% 
of the employees have a vocational diploma or some college education, 43.3% have completed 
college or have some university education, 27% have a bachelor’s degree or higher and 
approximately 12.7% have industrial training or other education. In Table 3, I find that most of 
the workplaces operate in the retail sector (31.7%), followed by education and health services 
and transport (12.1%). Small firms (less than 20 employees) represent 87.4% of the sample, 
whereas the percentage of medium firms (20 to 99) is approximately 10.8%; the categories large 
firms (100 to 499) and very large firms (500 employees or more) represent 1.5% and 0.2% of the 
sample, respectively. It should be noted that I use the sample weight to account for the complex 
survey design in all of the descriptive statistics. Lastly, it is impossible to disclose the minimum 
and the maximum values because of Statistics Canada’s confidentiality policy. 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
I first use a simultaneous probit model to examine the determinants of the availability of 
family-friendly practices while allowing worker and firm unobserved effects to be correlated 
across different models. Second, I estimate the trade-off between the availability of such 
practices and wages while taking unobserved effects into account. 
 
4.1 Correlated probit model 
 
Let 

ijtP  denote the net benefits accrued to an employee i   I1,...,  in firm j   J1,...,  at 
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time  Tt 1,...,  from having family-friendly practices.3 The probit model can be expressed as 
follows: 
 ijtjijjtijtijt ZXP  
 =                       (1) 
where ijtX  represents a vector of variables describing worker characteristics; jtZ  represents a 
vector of variables describing firm characteristics to which the worker is linked. The additional 
parameters ij  and j  capture the impact of unobserved worker and firm characteristics, 
respectively. ijt  is the error term. 
Worker effect can be interpreted as a measure of unobserved characteristics (e.g., 
different preferences, ability, motivation, ambition) that vary between employees and may affect 
the probability of having family-friendly work practices. Workplace effect is a measure of 
firm-specific unobserved characteristics common to all workers of the same workplace. For 
example, it can be interpreted as a measure of family-friendly practices offered to employees of 
the same firm. 
The identification of the worker and firm effects is made possible through the 
longitudinal and linked nature of the data. Identification of the firm effect is based on repeated 
observations of workers from the same firm. However, including unobserved pure worker 
heterogeneity is not possible because we do not observe worker mobility between firms in our 
data. Therefore, the identification of the worker effect is possible through the employer-
employee relationship ( ij ) because we have repeated observations on the same worker over 
time. I assume that unobserved characteristics are independent of observable characteristics. 
The variable ijtP  is not observed because it is a latent variable. Instead, we observe 
whether or not family-friendly practices are available. Hence, I define the following probit rule: 
 



 


0<if0
0if1
=
ijt
ijt
ijt
P
P
P         (2) 
where ijtP is a binary variable that equals one when the employee states that the firm provides 
family-friendly practices throughout the year and zero otherwise. I assume that both worker and 
                                                     
3
 In the WES questionnaire, the information regarding the availability of family-friendly work practices is given in 
the “employee” component. In other words, employees answer the question whether or not the firm provides such 
practices. 
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workplace heterogeneity are normally distributed with zero mean. 
I estimate equation (1) simultaneously for each type of family-friendly work practice 
while allowing the unobserved workplace and worker heterogeneity components to be correlated 
across models. Estimating the correlation between each type of family-friendly practice will be 
informative in determining whether these practices are substitutes or complements. Thus, I add 
the superscript d  to the latent model (1), where 1=d  (assistance for childcare), 2=  
(assistance for elder care) or 3=  (extended health care). Unobserved heterogeneity components 
d
ij  and 
d
j  follow a trivariate normal distribution
4
: 
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and 
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                      (4) 
where the diagonal of the covariance matrices (3) and (4) are the variances of ( 1ij , 
2
ij , 
3
ij ) and 
( 1j , 
2
j , 
3
j ), respectively. This specification entails the estimation of 12 parameters for the 
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity components. However, I settle on a slightly less 
involved specification to facilitate the likelihood calculation, where I assume that 
 (0,1)with,= Nijij
dd
ij                        (5) 
and 
 (0,1)with,= Njj
dd
j                        (6) 
This last specification requires the estimation of only 6 parameters ;,( dd   where 1,2,3)=d . 
The parameters of the distribution have interesting interpretations. For example, if 
12
  is 
positive, unobserved worker characteristics that are associated with more assistance for childcare 
are also associated with more assistance for elder care. I use maximum likelihood methods to 
obtain estimates for the parameters and their standard errors. Given that there is no closed-form 
                                                     
4
 Simultaneity is derived from worker and firm effects. Indeed, I are interested in the information given by the 
covariance matrix of the effect 
d
ij  and that of the effect 
d
j . 
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solution to the integral, the maximum likelihood estimates are computed by approximating the 
normal integral using a numerical integration algorithm based on adaptive Gauss-Hermite 
Quadrature. This algorithm selects a number of points and weights such that the weighted points 
approximate the normal distribution. 
 
4.2 Wage equation 
 
Turning to the estimation of the relationship between the availability of family-friendly practices 
and wages, I use the Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS) method to solve the problem of 
simultaneity in which the availability of family-friendly practices is determined simultaneously 
with wages.
5
 It is plausible that firms with the most family-friendly practices are also those that 
may have considerable impact on wages. Thus, the assumption of the exogeneity of the 
explanatory variable that indicates whether or not the family-friendly practice is available in the 
firm may be violated. Because the availability of family-friendly practices is endogenous, the 
estimator obtained by the OLS method could be biased. 
In our case, this procedure consists of instrumenting the family-friendly practices by variables 
that influence the probability of workers being provided family-friendly practices but will not 
affect wages. Specifically, I use the following instruments: whether or not the employee has 
dependent children or young children and whether or not there is a dispute, complaint or 
grievance system in the workplace. Heywood et al. (2007) mention that having dependent 
children or young children is correlated with family-friendly practices. For the second variable, 
the assumption is that the existence of a formal procedure to represent workers may improve 
aspects of work and therefore be beneficial for workers. Workers could therefore assume that the 
firm cares about their family responsibilities, which can affect the supply of family-friendly 
practices. Moreover, the underlying assumption is that these instruments are not correlated with 
the error term. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Determinants of the availability of family-friendly practices 
 
This section examines the determinants of the probability that family-friendly practices are 
                                                     
5
 Wooldridge (2002: 623-625) shows that there are no special considerations in using the 2SLS method when the 
endogenous explanatory variable is binary. 
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available to employees using a correlated probit model. Table 4 reports the marginal effects 
weighted by sampling weights. In all models, the dependent variable is a binary variable which 
equals one when a family-friendly practice is available and zero otherwise. I control for 
occupation, industry and year in all specifications. 
 
5.1.1 Employee characteristics 
 
Column (1) presents the results for childcare while columns (2) and (3) present the results for 
elder care and extended health care, respectively. The results reveal that being a woman 
increases the probability of having assistance for childcare. However, the result indicates that 
women are less likely to have assistance for elder care. It is possible that women may not have 
much time for elderly persons because women are more involved in child care and spend more 
time with their children, which may suggest that men have more time than women do and 
consequently can allocate more time for elderly persons. These results are consistent with those 
reported in previous studies (e.g., Bardoel et al., 1999; Budd and Mumford, 2004; Budd and 
Mumford, 2006; Heywood and Jirjahn, 2009). The estimated marginal effect for the extended 
health care variable is positive but not statistically significant. 
The results also show a negative and statistically significant effect of marital status on the 
probability of having assistance for elder care, i.e., married employees are less likely to have 
assistance for elder care. It is possible that in certain firms single employees have more 
dependent elders for which to care. Perhaps surprisingly, I find that immigrants are more likely 
to have assistance for childcare and elder care. One might speculate that immigrants face more 
difficulties than others in the workplaces, which might lead to an increase in the provision of 
such practices. As in Osterman (1995), Bardoel et al. (1999) and Budd and Mumford (2006), 
employee age is not statistically significant associated with the provision of the three 
family-friendly practices. 
Contrary to the predictions of the neo-classical theory stating that labour market supply 
and demand pressures lead a number of firms to offer family-friendly practices (see the 
discussion provided in Budd and Mumford, 2006: 93-94), the results highlight a negative effect 
of the number of children on the probability of having assistance for childcare, assistance for 
elder care and extended health care. However, this effect is small in magnitude and is statistically 
significant only for assistance for childcare in accordance with previous literature (e.g., Bardoel 
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et al., 1999) in the case of firms in Australia and Budd and Mumford (2006) in the case of firms 
in Britain). 
With respect to the human capital variables, I find that only the category “Bachelor’s 
degree or higher”, which is the highest level of education, is associated with a greater probability 
of having assistance for elder care and extended health care. It is indeed logical to believe that 
positions requiring a high level of education are more likely to offer family-friendly practices. 
However, categories such as “Vocational diploma or some college”, “Completed college or some 
university” and “Industrial training or other” have no effect on such practices. It is therefore 
difficult to conclude if education is a predictor of these family-friendly practices. I also find that 
seniority is not an important determinant for the availability of such practices. It is plausible to 
conclude that firms do not reward employee seniority by offering more family-friendly practices. 
This result was also reported by Osterman (1995) and Budd and Mumford (2006). 
 
5.1.2 Job characteristics 
 
The results show that part-time employees are less likely to have assistance for all types of care. 
Indeed, part-time works are generally less profitable in terms of fringe benefits, and these 
employees are less likely to participate in available benefit plans such as family-friendly 
practices. In addition, it is possible that these part-time employees are attracted to jobs that do 
not offer family-friendly practices. 
I find that workers with compressed work week schedules (i.e., more hours worked to 
reduce the number of work days) are more likely to obtain assistance for childcare and elder 
care. The results also indicate a positive and statistically significant effect of the variable 
promotion received on the three types of family-friendly practices. By the same token, I find that 
holding a supervisory position is positively correlated with the probability of having assistance 
for childcare and for elder care. Supervisors are often overburdened by responsibilities, which 
may lead them to spend more time at work and increase their demand for family-friendly 
practices. These results suggest that tasks requiring more responsibilities are positively 
associated with the availability of family-friendly practices. Past research has highlighted the 
positive effects of supervisors in terms of work-family conflict (e.g. Valcouret al. 2011). 
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Contrary to results reported in previous empirical studies (e.g., Budd and Mumford, 
2006; Heywood and Jirjahn, 2009), unions do not influence the availability of the three 
family-friendly practices. This result lends support to Osterman’s (1995) finding that the 
probability of having such practices is not influenced by being unionized in the U.S. This result 
could be explained by the low percentages of unionization in our sample (28% and 26% in 1999 
and 2005, respectively). These numbers are quite close to the figure obtained by Osterman 
(1995) in the U.S., approximately 19%. However, the percentage of union workers was 60% in 
Britain (Budd and Mumford, 2006) and 59% in Germany (Heywood and Jirjahn, 2009). These 
findings suggest that the effect of unions on the availability of family-friendly practices is likely 
to be more pronounced in Europe than in North America. 
 
5.1.3 Firm characteristics 
 
It is commonly believed that part-time employees are less likely to receive fringe benefits. I find 
that firms with a higher proportion of part-time permanent employees are statistically significant 
less likely to offer assistance for elder care and extended health care. The result for assistance for 
childcare is also negative but not statistically significant. By the same token, I find that firms 
with a higher proportion of part-time temporary employees are less likely to offer the three 
family-friendly practices, but the result is statistically significant only for assistance for elder 
care. I also find that workplaces with a higher proportion of contractual employees are less likely 
to offer assistance for childcare. These results are consistent with those reported in previous 
studies (e.g., Budd and Mumford, 2006; Heywood and Jirjahn, 2009). I lastly find that the 
proportion of managers in the workforce generally has a positive influence on the provision of 
assistance for childcare and elder care, perhaps reflecting that higher positions are associated 
with a higher probability of having more fringe benefits. 
The results reveal that job training provision exhibits a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the three types of family-friendly practices. It is possible that firms that help 
employees with job training are able to bear the costs of training as well as the costs of the 
provision of family-friendly practices. Another plausible explanation for this result is that firms 
invest in employees through job training perhaps to retain their high-quality employees, which 
may lead to providing them more fringe benefits. Interestingly, I find that firms that have 
difficulty in filling vacant positions are more likely to offer assistance for childcare and elder 
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care, indicating that perhaps firms use family-friendly programs to reduce labour market 
tightness. 
Lastly, the estimated marginal effect on the firm size variable is positive and statistically 
significant. Indeed, it is commonly argued that larger firms have more organized human 
resources management and tend to provide more fringe benefits perhaps because of the 
unpleasant working environment due to increasing labour divisions and impersonal working 
atmosphere (Masters, 1969: 342; Schmidt and Zimmerman, 1991: 705). In addition, large firms 
are more likely to bear the costs of such practices than are smaller ones. 
 
5.1.4 Unobserved worker and firm characteristics 
 
The estimates for the unobserved heterogeneity distribution are presented in the last panel of 
Table 4. Worker effect can be interpreted as a measure of unobserved characteristics (e.g., 
different preferences, ability, motivation, ambition) that vary between employees and may affect 
the probability of having family-friendly practices. Firm effect is a measure of firm-specific 
unobserved characteristics common to all workers of the same workplace.  
The values of the unobserved firm heterogeneity are found to be positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that assistance for childcare, assistance for elder care and extended health 
care are positively correlated. Thus, for example, firms that offer assistance for childcare 
simultaneously offer assistance for elder care and extended health care. However, I find that the 
values the of the unobserved worker heterogeneity are not statistically significant for assistance 
for childcare or assistance for elder care. These results indicate that unobservable firm 
characteristics have more significant effects than unobservable worker characteristics on the 
firms’ probability to provide family-friendly practices. These results could be explained by 
Rebitzer and Taylor’s (1995) model on the role played by unobservable (to the firm) worker 
heterogeneity in analyzing how firms respond to worker preferences regarding wage-working 
hours-fringe benefits. They note that work preferences are heterogeneous and unobserved by the 
firm; therefore, working hours and fringe benefits tend to be set by the firm. Consequently, one 
can assume that unobserved firm characteristics may play an important role in explaining the 
provision of family-friendly practices. 
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5.2 Availability of family-friendly practices and wages 
 
Turning to the estimation of the relationship between the availability of family-friendly practices 
and wages, I use the Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS) method to solve the problem of 
simultaneity in which the availability of family-friendly practices is determined simultaneously 
with wages. Table 5 presents the 2SLS estimates without control variables while Table 6 
includes standard controls for worker, job and firm characteristics. The results suggest a stronger 
negative pattern. I find that assistance for childcare, elder care and extended health care are 
associated with a reduction in workers’ wages when all control variables are excluded. This 
result is also confirmed when I run the full specifications that include all control variables. The 
results provide strong evidence for the existence of a hedonic equilibrium in which workers face 
an implicit reduction in their wages. These results are consistent with those found in some 
previous studies (e.g., Baughman et al,. 2003; Eriksson and Kristensen, 2011; Heywood et al., 
2007). I argue that the existence of a hedonic equilibrium could be explained by the theory that 
considers wages as a partial exchange of gifts between workers and firms (Akerlof, 1982). 
According to this theory, fringe benefits are to some extent perceived as a gift or a signal that 
employers care about employees’ family responsibilities, and in return, employees are willing to 
pay to receive such practices. Eriksson and Kristensen (2011: 19) note that family-friendly 
practices are perceived as a means of meeting the special needs of employees; therefore, 
individuals are willing to pay for family-friendly practices regardless of the amount offered from 
such practices. Lastly, it is also possible that part of the negative effect of the availability of 
family-friendly practices could be related to the inherent differences between jobs that offer 
family-friendly practices and jobs that do not. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Family-friendly work practices have been introduced in the workplaces for some time, and 
surprisingly, their implications on workers have not been extensively analyzed by scholars in the 
context of the employee-employer relationship. This paper analyzes the determinants of the 
availability of three family-friendly work care practices and the impact of such practices on 
wages using linked employee-employer dataset. The empirical investigation improves on 
previous studies in two ways. I first use a correlated probit model for the determinants of the 
availability of family-friendly practices. Second, I take into account unobserved effects in the 
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wage equation, leading to more accurate estimates. 
The results emphasize that women are more likely to have assistance for childcare but 
less likely to have assistance for elder care. Perhaps surprisingly, the results indicate that 
immigrants are more likely to have assistance for childcare and elder care. These results could be 
explained by factors linked to labour supply and demand pressures that may lead firms to offer 
more or less than the optimal amount of family-friendly practices. Interestingly, I find that firms 
that have difficulty in filling vacant positions are more likely to offer assistance for childcare and 
elder care, indicating that perhaps firms use family-friendly programs to reduce labour market 
tightness. 
Promoted workers, those who hold supervisory positions, the proportion of workforce 
managers and the highest level of education achieved tend to exert positive effects on firms’ 
probability of providing the three types of family-friendly practices. Supervisors and managers 
are often overburdened by responsibilities, which may possibly lead them to spend more time at 
work and increase their demand for family-friendly practices. The positive effects of these 
covariates may also suggest that workers receive these practices informally as part of additional 
fringe benefits. 
I find that unions have no impact on the availability of the three types of family-friendly 
practices, a result that underscores a similarity with previous findings from the U.S. but a 
difference from some studies from Europe (Britain and German). This result may suggest that 
the role of unions is more pronounced in North America than in Europe in regard to the design of 
family-friendly work policies. 
The results also show that the provision of family-friendly practices is negatively 
correlated with worker wage, indicating the existence of a hedonic equilibrium. This result seems 
to support the view that better working conditions, including the provision of family-friendly 
practices, lead to the emergence of an implicit market in which firms offset the costs of 
providing such practices though lower wages. Heywood et al. (2007) use two measures for the 
availability of family-friendly practices. The first accounts for the employee’s response to their 
firm’s provision of such practices, whereas the second includes manager response. In my paper, I 
use the employee’s response because it is the only available variable on the provision of 
family-friendly practices in the WES dataset. The results are similar to those of Heywood et al. 
(2007) only when they use workers’ response to provide information on the provision of these 
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practices. It is possible that the impact of the availability of such practices on wages depends on 
the source that reports this information, i.e., the employer or the employee. For example, when 
the information is provided by employees, it is possible that employees are better informed than 
managers about the availability of such practices, especially when these practices are considered 
non-pecuniary benefits and the amount offered may be specified in employment contracts. 
Lastly, the results from this paper may have some policy implications. The enhancing 
effects of promotions received, supervisory positions, proportion of workforce managers and the 
highest level of education achieved seem to suggest that the provision of family-friendly 
practices should be improved through policies that facilitate the availability of such practices to 
workers from different occupations and job positions. The existence of a trade-off between 
family-friendly practices and earnings suggests that initiatives that tend to increase the provision 
of such practices may need to account for the differences in costs between firms that limit a good 
number of firms aiming to increase the availability of such practices. Indeed, if this trade-off is 
too large, the labour supply can decrease and firms may face difficulties in recruiting highly 
skilled workers. Moreover, firms may bear higher costs in hiring new employees, which may 
cause governments to increase the provision of these practices by subsidizing them, especially if 
the provision of such practices depends on the level of earnings reduction. 
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Table 1: Analysis of variance in family-friendly work practices 1999-2005 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Childcare      
 Overall   0.044   0.205  
 Between firms     0.058  
 Within firms     0.204  
 
Elder care      
 Overall   0.064   0.246  
 Between firms     0.123  
 Within firms     0.243  
 
Extended health care      
 Overall   0.421   0.268  
 Between firms     0.106  
 Within firms     0.267  
Number of observations   81,054  
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Table 2: Summary statistics - Employees 
 Variable     1999   2005  
    Mean   Std. Dev.   Mean   Std. Dev.  
Socio-demographic characteristics              
 Women     0.521   0.499   0.522   0.499  
 Married     0.566   0.495   0.531   0.450  
 Black     0.011   0.105   0.010   0.102  
 Age     39.637   11.064   40.902   11.902  
 Immigrant     0.175   0.380   0.179   0.383  
 Number of children aged 0 to 18     0.779   1.040   0.680    0.987  
 Single-parent     0.127   0.333   0.118   0.323  
 Total family income (000s)     67993.080   55748.100   77033.62   54456.58  
 No activity limitation due to health issues     0.017    0.129   0.022   0.266  
Human Capital            
 Seniority     8.428   8.192   8.748   8.740  
 Experience     16.183   10.713   17.569   11.500  
 Vocational diploma or some college   0.325   0.468    0.271   0.444  
 Completed college or some university   0.433   0.495    0.462   0.498  
 Bachelor’s degree or higher  0.269   0.443    0.287   0.452  
 Industrial training or other    0.127   0.333   0.067   0.250  
Job characteristics              
 Work part-time     0.201   0.401   0.209   0.406  
 Work regular hours     0.709    0.453   0.683   0.465  
 Work from Monday to Friday     0.254   0.435   0.780    0.414  
 Work on a reduced work week     0.139   0.346   0.069    0.253  
 Work on compressed work week schedule     0.085   0.279   0.080    0.271  
 Promotion received     0.381    0.485   0.376   0.484  
 Supervise the work of other employees     0.379   0.480   0.387    0.487  
 Covered by a collective bargaining agreement      0.280   0.449   0.261   0.439  
Occupation              
 Manager     0.147   0.354   0.126   0.332  
 Professional     0.160   0.366   0.171   0.377  
 Technician     0.393   0.488   0.408   0.491  
 Marketing/sales     0.082   0.275    0.079   0.271  
 Clerical/administrative     0.141   0.348   0.147    0.354  
 Production w/o certificate     0.074   0.263   0.066    0.248  
Number of observations      23,540   24,197  
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        Table 3: Summary statistics - Employers 
 Variable   1999  
  Mean   Std. Dev.  
Firm characteristics      
 Proportion of contractual workforce   0.017   0.334  
 Proportion of part-time permanent employees   0.711   0.334  
 Proportion of part-time temporary employees   0.288   0.334  
 Proportion of managers   0.165   0.221  
 Employer helping with training   0.219   0.413  
 Difficulty to fill vacant positions   0.126   0.332  
 Workplace size:      
 19 employees and less   0.874   0.331  
 20-99 employees   0.108   0.310  
 100-499 employees   0.015   0.122  
 500 employees and more   0.002   0.047  
Industry      
 Natural resources   0.018   0.135  
 Primary product manufacturing   0.010   0.100  
 Secondary product manufacturing   0.017   0.130  
 Labour-intensive tertiary manufacturing   0.030   0.173  
 Capital-intensive tertiary manufacturing   0.023   0.150  
 Construction   0.077   0.266  
 Transportation   0.121   0.326  
 Communication and other utilities   0.012   0.111  
 Retail trade and consumer service   0.317   0.465  
 Finance and insurance   0.052   0.222  
 Real estate   0.043   0.203  
 Business services   0.112   0.316  
 Education and health services   0.140   0.347  
 Information and cultural industries   0.022   0.146  
Number of observations   6,271  
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Table 4: Determinants of family-friendly practices, simultaneous probit model 
  (1)   (2)   (3)  
  Childcare   Elder care   Extended health care  
Socio-demographic characteristics        
 Women   0.139***   -0.269***   0.058  
  (0.026)   (0.036)   (0.030)  
 Married   -0.044   -0.222***   0.074***  
  (0.029)   (0.040)   (0.034)  
 Black   -0.086   -0.149   -0.292***  
  (0.110)   (0.150)   (0.110)  
 Age   -0.000   -0.001   0.001  
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
 Age squared   0.000   -0.000   0.000  
  (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)  
 Immigrant   0.123***   0.157***   0.001  
  (0.029)   (0.040)   (0.034)  
 Number of children aged 0 to 18   -0.044***   -0.015   -0.005  
  (0.012)   (0.016)   (0.014)  
 Single-parent   -0.048   -0.104   0.074  
  (0.043)   (0.057)   (0.047)  
 Total family income (000s)   0.000***   0.000***   0.000  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
 No activity limitation due to health issues   -0.010   0.016   0.036  
  (0.044)   (0.060)   (0.048)  
Human Capital        
 Seniority   -0.000   0.001   -0.001  
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
 Seniority squared (/100)   0.000***   0.000***   0.000***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
 Experience   0.007   -0.015***   0.001  
  (0.003)   (0.005)   (0.004)  
 Experience squared (/100)   -0.000   0.000***   -0.000  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
 Vocational diploma or some college   -0.015   -0.028   -0.005  
  (0.025)   (0.035)   (0.028)  
 Completed college or some university   0.037   0.012   -0.032  
  (0.023)   (0.031)   (0.027)  
 Bachelor’s degree or higher   -0.045   0.108***   0.090***  
  (0.027)   (0.035)   (0.035)  
 Industrial training or other   0.043   0.087   -0.019  
  (0.034)   (0.046)   (0.040)  
Job characteristics        
 Work part-time   -0.159***   -0.275***   -0.230***  
  (0.048)   (0.064)   (0.057)  
 Work regular hours   -0.046   0.053   0.068***  
  (0.029)   (0.039)   (0.034)  
 Work from Monday to Friday   0.044   0.097   0.040  
  (0.038)   (0.050)   (0.039)  
 Work on a reduced work week   -0.043   0.048   0.103***  
  (0.038)   (0.049)   (0.046)  
 Work on compressed work week schedule   0.173***   0.120***   -0.038  
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  (0.043)   (0.058)  (0.048) 
 Promotion received   0.242***   0.248***  0.082*** 
  (0.024)   (0.034)  (0.028) 
 Supervise the work of other employees   0.098***   0.097***  0.009 
  (0.024)   (0.033)  (0.029) 
 Covered by a collective bargaining agreement   0.046   0.046  0.055 
  (0.028)   (0.036)  (0.033) 
Firm characteristics       
 Proportion of contractual workforce   -0.061***   0.007  0.070 
  (0.027)   (0.063)  (0.052) 
 Proportion of part-time permanent employees   -0.099   -0.287***  -0.171*** 
  (0.069)   (0.087)  (0.070) 
 Proportion of part-time temporary employees   -0.058   -0.446***  -0.092 
  (0.063)   (0.088)  (0.069) 
 Proportion of managers in the workforce   0.263***   0.345***  0.092 
  (0.067)   (0.094)  (0.076) 
 Employer helping with training   0.194***   0.241***  0.072*** 
  (0.030)   (0.042)  (0.029) 
 Difficulty to fill vacant positions   0.076***   0.289***  -0.746 
  (0.024)   (0.036)  (0.125) 
 Workplace size:       
 20-99 employees   0.258***   0.187***  0.014 
  (0.041)   (0.062)  (0.037) 
 100-499 employees   0.482***   0.393***  0.037 
  (0.045)   (0.069)  (0.042) 
 500 employees and more   0.611***   0.213***  0.193*** 
  (0.051)   (0.088)  (0.057) 
Constant and unobserved heterogeneity parameters  
 Constant  -4.086*** -4.305***    4.791*** 
 (0.171) (0.313)     (0.755) 
 Unobserved worker heterogeneity  -0.089 -0.183    1.599*** 
 (0.064) (0.116)     (0.310) 
 Unobserved firm heterogeneity 0.894*** 1.662***    0.273*** 
 (0.037) (0.106)    (0.128) 
    
Number of observations   81,054  
Industry dummies (14)   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Occupation dummies (6)   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year dummies (7)   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Notes: Statistical significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%. Robust standard error in parentheses.  
The reference category for firm size is 19 employees and less.  
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 Table 5: The effect of the availability of family-friendly practices on wages (Initial estimates), 2SLS  
  Control Variables: None  
Explanatory Variable   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  
Childcare   -16.197***       -3.145***      
  (2.427)       (1.369)      
Elder care     
-4.604***   
     -3.894***    
    (1.613)       (1.584)    
Extended health care       -18.167***       -16.936***  
      (2.412)       (2.316)  
Number of observations   81,054    81,054  
Industry dummies (14)   No   No   No   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Occupation dummies (6)   No   No   No   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year dummies (7)   No   No   No   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Statistical significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.  
Robust standard error in parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
Table 6: The effect of the availability of family-friendly practices on wages (Full model), 2SLS 
  Control Variables:  
  Employee and firm characteristics  
Explanatory Variable   (1)   (2)   (3)  
Childcare   -2.399***      
  (1.045)      
Elder care     -3.089***    
    (1.010)    
Extended health care       -11.872***  
      (3.710)  
Black   -0.243   -0.188   -0.671***  
  (0.180)   (0.196)   (0.230)  
Age   0.002   0.003   -0.005  
  (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.004)  
Immigrant   0.062   0.469***   -0.057  
  (0.072)   (0.074)   (0.054)  
Single-parent   0.022   0.031   0.012  
  (0.056)   (0.055)   (0.062)  
Total family income (000s)   0.000***   0.000***   0.000***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
No activity limitation due to health issues   0.482***   0.608***   0.490***  
  (0.076)   (0.102)   (0.082)  
Seniority   -0.031***   -0.031***   -0.024***  
  (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.008)  
Seniority squared (/100)   0.001***   0.001***   0.001***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Experience   0.033***   0.051***   0.079***  
  (0.011)   (0.051)   (0.011)  
Experience squared (/100)   -0.001***   0.000   -0.001***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Vocational diploma some college   -0.293***   -0.307***   -0.280***  
  (0.060)   (0.060)   (0.069)  
Completed college or some university   0.226***   0.226***   0.337***  
  (0.056)   (0.055)   (0.065)  
Bachelor’s degree or higher   1.029***   .925***   1.270***  
  (0.067)   (0.069)   (0.101)  
Industrial training or other   -0.199***   -0.152***   -0.075  
  (0.068)   (0.067)   (0.081)  
Work part-time   -1.015***   -1.006***   -1.481***  
  (0.095)   (0.089)   (0.215)  
Work regular hours   0.805***   0.740***   0.811***  
  (0.060)   (0.054)   (0.069)  
Work from Monday to Friday    -0.070       -0.082      0.308***    
  (0.065)   (0.064)   (0.127)  
Work on a reduced work week   -0.028   -0.031   -0.092  
  (0.097)   (0.101)   (0.100)  
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Work on compressed work week schedule   -0.299***   -0.287***   -0.025  
  (0.063)   (0.063)   (0.096)  
Work done at home   1.211***   1.197***   1.354***  
  (0.044)   (0.041)   (0.061)  
Promotion received   0.347***   0.341***   0.413***  
  (0.048)   (0.056)   (0.063)  
Supervise the work of other employees   0.295***   0.279***   0.261***  
  (0.044)   (0.049)   (0.045)  
Workplace size:        
20-99 employees   0.122   0.176***   0.199***  
  (0.096)   (0.072)   (0.093)  
100-499 employees   0.170*   0.273***   0.358***  
  (0.100)   (0.075)   (0.100)  
500 employees and more   0.403***   0.261***   0.518***  
  (0.135)   (0.084)   (0.127)  
Number of observations   81,054  
Industry dummies (14)      Yes          Yes       Yes 
Occupation dummies (6)      Yes          Yes       Yes 
Year dummies (7)      Yes          Yes       Yes 
Statistical significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.  
Robust standard error in parentheses.  
 
 
 
